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Germany, with mixed results. Despite 
a relentless and costly air campaign, 
the German Wehrmacht could only be 
defeated on the ground. A basic concept 
of strategic-bombing theory held that 
heavy civilian casualties would force 
enemy leaders to sue for peace, but 
the theorists and practitioners did not 
factor in the callous nature of despotic 
leaders who cared little for the welfare 
of their citizenry. (For more informa-
tion on this subject see Among the Dead 
Cities: The History and Moral Legacy 
of the WWII Bombing of Civilians in 
Germany and Japan, by A. C. Grayling.)
Japan was a different story. Arnold 
envisioned unleashing the as-yet-
unfielded B-29 Superfortresses on 
Japan en masse. The USAAF first tried 
conducting operations from China, but 
that proved untenable for a variety of 
reasons. Eventually airfields on Guam, 
Saipan, and Tinian, islands that were 
taken at great cost, came into exis-
tence for sustained B-29 operations.
The air war against Japan was much 
more than the story of B-29 raids on 
Tokyo and other targets. One little-
known operation went under the dark 
moniker of Operation STARVATION, the 
deployment of aerial mines by B-29s. 
These sorties proved quite effective 
in whittling down Japan’s merchant 
marine, thus devastating Japan’s morale 
and eroding its capability for war pro-
duction. USAAF crews delivered twelve 
thousand mines, sinking 293 ships 
between March and April 1945. Yet for 
all the successes that the United States 
had in the skies over Japan, the USAAF 
and U.S. Navy cooperated little in the 
planning and implementation of the 
overall campaign. Each service pursued 
its own air operations, the Army going 
after Japan’s cities and the Navy after 
Japan’s fleet and coastal shipping.
Tillman’s excellent book is well re-
searched and well written. He reintro-
duces the reader to the pivotal leaders 
who played a role in the execution of 
the air war on Japan. He rounds out 
his narrative with accounts from B-29 
aircrews and naval aviators who flew at 
the tip of the spear aimed at Japan; their 
observations and recollections add an 
excellent sense of humanity to the story. 
His account also serves to validate joint 
operations, a lesson borne out by the 
experience of this war and one that our 
military continues to observe today.
This book will not end the debate on the 
value and moral justification of the U.S. 
air war on Japan. Tillman clearly makes 
the point that while the air war against 
Japan did not end the conflict on its 
own, it did affect Japan’s ability to con-
tinue to wage war. In the end it is clear 
that Japan was willing to fight despite 
the destruction of its cities and that it 
was preparing mightily for the expected 
invasion of the home islands. However, 
it was the atomic attacks on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki that finally forced Japan 
to seek peace and end the slaughter.
CDR. DAVID L. TESKA, U.S. COAST GUARD RESERVE
San Diego, California
Jordan, Jonathan W. Brothers, Rivals, Victors: 
Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and the Partnership 
That Drove the Allied Conquest in Europe. New 
York: NAL Caliber, 2011. 672pp. $28.95
This is an exceptional book. Although 
it has its share of strategy, logistics, 
and technology, it is primarily a book 
about relationships and leadership. 
1
Norton and Jordan: Brothers, Rivals, Victors: Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and the P
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 B O O K  R E V I E W S  179
In what is ostensibly a triple biogra-
phy, George S. Patton, Jr., and Omar 
Bradley get their fair share of atten-
tion, but in the end it is Dwight David 
Eisenhower who dominates the pages. 
Jordan has produced what is in many 
ways a paragon of modern biographies. 
The darker sides of his subjects are 
not overlooked or glossed over, as in 
E. B. Potter’s Bull Halsey, nor does the 
book descend into the merely salacious 
and prurient, as sometimes occurs in 
Evan Thomas’s Sea of Thunder. Jordan 
paints pictures of whole men, and 
with remarkable fidelity. Meticulously 
researched, this work neither shies away 
from nor lingers on the flaws each man 
possessed. For example Patton’s philan-
dering and alcohol abuse in the 1930s 
are reasonably depicted as characteristic 
of an ambitious warrior trapped in a 
peacetime army, bored, restless, and des-
perately worried that his moment had 
come and gone. Likewise, Eisenhower’s 
relationship with Kay Summersby is 
addressed directly. The relationship was 
inappropriate and, from a security point 
of view, reckless. Bradley worried about 
this, as did Marshall and members of 
Eisenhower’s personal staff. However, 
Jordan concludes that Eisenhower 
needed Kay to maintain some sense of 
stability in his life and that whatever 
degree of infidelity it entailed was com-
pensated by Ike’s resulting performance. 
Jordan also discusses in detail the 
episode in which Eisenhower reached 
a point where he was willing to force 
his superiors to fire either Montgomery 
or him. This was an example of superb 
political acumen and the use of power. 
Jordan documents Patton’s remarkable 
churlishness and childishness, as well as 
his extraordinary drive and sense of the 
operational moment. Jordan displays 
both a keen understanding of and sym-
pathy for the flamboyant Patton, just as 
he does with Eisenhower. With Bradley, 
however, Jordan is just a touch less sure-
footed, perhaps because Bradley was by 
nature a more private man. Yet for all 
that, there are few passages more mov-
ing and superbly depicted than those 
describing Bradley’s reaction when, dur-
ing the Battle of the Bulge, Eisenhower 
took the First and Ninth Armies and 
assigned them to Montgomery. Brad-
ley’s rage and hurt were only magni-
fied when his threat of resignation was 
ignored. However, his rage was nothing 
compared to the mean-spiritedness of 
Patton, who, removed from command, 
savaged in his diary his boss and former 
friend, alleging that Eisenhower suffered 
from moral turpitude and cowardice.
Because Jordan understands the nature 
of these men’s relationships, he is able 
to convey the tragedy that accompanied 
them. Above all, he documents with 
marked sympathy the forging and the 
gradual undoing of the Eisenhower-
Patton friendship, as much a casualty of 
Patton’s selfishness and lack of empa-
thy as the inevitable consequence of 
friends occupying different levels of 
command responsibility. The friend-
ship between Eisenhower and Gen-
eral Bradley was equally damaged but 
much more rapidly, stemming from 
what Bradley felt was a betrayal.
These friendships would in time be, if 
not fully repaired, reconciled. Eisen-
hower, following the death of Patton, 
focused more and more on his late 
friend’s sterling qualities. Perhaps 
this was easier in Patton’s absence. 
Paradoxically, when Patton’s reputa-
tion had threatened to eclipse those 
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of other generals, Eisenhower went 
out of his way to laud Bradley as the 
“best combat general of the war.”
Although the troika holds center stage, 
Jordan looks at other relationships these 
men had. The central role of George 
Marshall is explored, along with that 
which Bedell Smith played in sup-
porting Eisenhower. Junior combat 
commanders such as Lucian Truscott 
and Mark Clark are given their due.
If all this book delivered were a 
deeper understanding of these three 
iconic military figures, it would be 
well worth the read, but it provides 
much more. For, in addition to reveal-
ing the human side of three generals, 
it also compares and contrasts their 
very different leadership styles and 
methods. Although understated, this 
comparison elevates the book even 
further and makes it a must-have for 
any shelf of serious leadership texts.
RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College 
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